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Recovery for Mental Harm Under Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention: An
Interpretation of L6sion Corporelle
By DANA STANCULESCU*
Member of the Class of 1985
I. INTRODUCTION
As international relations become increasingly important, the role of
treaties as legal instruments regulating those relations has become vital.
One of the most controversial, difficult, and recurring problems with
treaties is how to interpret them. This problem is aggravated by the fact
that international treaties are usually drawn up in several languages, and
the various multilingual versions frequently convey different nuances.
The sources of these discrepancies range from drafting and translation
errors to difficulties arising from fundamental differences between the
theories of jurisprudence underlying different legal systems. Moreover,
certain expressions simply defy translation or require a particular choice
of words, making parity of language virtually impossible.
In light of these problems, numerous rules have been developed to
aid in the interpretation of multilingual treaties. These rules depend in
part on the authoritativeness of a particular version. Thus, while it ap-
pears that no interpretation question would arise when a treaty is written
in a single authoritative version, this is often not the case. When the
original version has not been adopted as the official version and a term of
the official version is in controversy, the issue arises whether rules of
treaty interpretation permit resort to the original version as a supplemen-
tal means of interpretation.
This problem is well illustrated by cases involving the interpretation
of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Inter-
national Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention).' The Warsaw
Convention comes into play in virtually every lawsuit involving interna-
* The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable guidance of Professor Rudolf B.
Schlesinger.
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-
tion by Air, done Oct. 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000-26 (1935-1936).
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
tional air traffic accidents, lost baggage, or hijacking. It is obviously "not
a treaty that has mouldered on the books." 2 Although the original ver-
sion is in French, United States courts have used an official translation in
English that has never been adopted by the parties to the Warsaw Con-
vention. As to the propriety of this use, two schools of thought have
emerged. The first essentially advocates the French legal meaning as
binding. The second gives effect to the common-law meaning of the
terms translated into English.
The first section of this Note discusses the sources of treaty interpre-
tation problems and the various approaches that have been advanced as
solutions. It will set forth the general rules of treaty interpretation under
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States and the
Vienna Convention. Next, the Note will analyze the purpose and intent
of the framers of the Warsaw Convention and its particular linguistic
stance. The following sections examine a line of judicial decisions that
have used the rules of treaty interpretation in interpreting Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention. Article 17 allows recovery for "wounding" or
"bodily injury."3 The issue in each of these cases is whether Article 17
provides recovery for emotional distress absent some physical cause or
manifestation. The decisions adopt several interpretative approaches,
reaching differing results. This Note will make a determination as to the
extent to which each of the decisions complies with the rules of treaty
interpretation. Arguments will be presented in support of the line of de-
cisions which advocate that the French legal meaning is binding and
which liberally allow resort to means of interpretation extraneous to the
text of the Convention. The Note concludes that the approach which
utilizes the French legal meaning is doctrinally correct and should guide
future interpretations of the Warsaw Convention.
2. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
3. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides in relevant part: "The carder shall be
liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other
bodily injury suffered by the passenger. . . ." 49 Stat. 3000, 3018 (1935-1936).
The original French version is: "le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en
cas de mort, de blessure ou de toute autre lision corporelle ... " Id. at 3005. Adopting the
position that the French legal meaning should be considered binding, the Note will focus on
whether the term "Ision corporelle" (bodily injury) allows for recovery for mental harm absent
a physical impact or consequence.
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II. SOURCES OF PROBLEMS IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES
Even in a monolingual situation it has been said that "true commu-
nication is only possible among those who think alike." 4 Transposing the
difficulties of person-to-person communication onto a nation-to-nation
scale brings with it an increased potential for misinterpretation. This is
necessarily so because each language through its peculiar structure em-
bodies a world outlook which differs from that of any other language.5
Few translations can take an idea originally expressed in one language
and transfer it to another without changing it.6 In effect, a translation is
an interpretation subject to a number of variables such as the nature of
the text, the skill of the translator, and the translator's subjective under-
standing of the material.
Problems with the interpretation of international treaties arise on
three different levels. First, certain divergences may occur on a purely
linguistic level. For example, homonyms present traps, 7 for even when
the principal meaning coincides in both the source language and the tar-
get language, there still may be a second, unexpected connotation in one
language.8 Second, the purely philological problem of translating ideas
from one language into another is further complicated when concepts
from one legal system are being translated into another.9 The difficulty
4. E. FORSTHOFF, RECHT UND SPRACHE 11 (1940), cited in M. HILF, infra note 6, at 21.
This attitude of "semantic scepticism" is shared by Judge Jerome Frank. See Frank, Civil Law
Influences on the Common Law?: Some Reflections on "Comparative"and "Contrastire" Law,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 887, 917-19 (1956).
5. Frank, supra note 4, at 919.
6. An experienced court interpreter observes: "Languages are not congruent. Translat-
ing is therefore always difficult, usually more difficult than to express oneself directly in a
foreign language." Werner, Linguistic-Judicial Remarks on Decisions in Restitution Mattems
1954 JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU 168. See also M. HiLF, AUSLEGUNG MEHRSPRACHIGER VER-
TRGE 22 (1973).
7. For example, the French contrat domicil tribunal administratif, notaire prescription,
andjuge depaix are not the equivalents of the English contract, domicile, administrative tribu-
nal, notary, prescription, and justice of the peace. A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANS PLANhTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 11 (1974). Such homonyms are also termed "false
equivalents" (faux d quivalents). R. MANKIEWICZ, MILANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE PAUL
ROUBIER 105 (1961).
8. E.g., the French word lMsion is commonly translated as injury but it may also mean
damage, wounding, or infringement of a right. Mankiewicz, The Application of Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention to Mental Suffering Not Related to Physical Injury, 4 ANNALs AIR &
SPACE L. 187, 197 (1979).
9. This type of problem was illustrated by Hilf, who noted that it would be very difficult
for somebody trained in common law to understand the concept of force majeure or dol. M.
HILF, supra note 6, at 24. On the other hand, proximate cause and res ipsa loquitur are legal
19851
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occurs because the rule of law or concept to be translated may either
have an entirely different technical connotation or be altogether nonexis-
tent in the target language. 1° A translation of a foreign legal text is in
itself an exercise in comparative law. 1 Therefore, the knowledge of a
foreign language required for legal translation is often much greater than
the knowledge necessary for nonlegal translation.12
Finally, a particular type of interpretation problem inherent in inter-
national treaties is vagueness. Treaties are based on many individual
compromises, yet the far-reaching political implications inherent in these
compromises are often left unresolved through the use of vague terms."
The greater the number of participants to the treaty, the less likely it is
that a perfect linguistic formulation will be reached. Therefore, fre-
quently drafters will broadly formulate a treaty and deliberately intro-
duce vague concepts and wide-ranging doctrines so as to invite future
interpretation. 4 These semantic manipulations 5 allow for the extension
of international treaties to previously unregulated areas.
In view of the enumerated problems, a proper translation of interna-
tional treaties should involve two stages of analysis. First, the literal,
nontechnical meaning of each term must be established. Second, the
legal meaning of each term must be ascertained through study of cases,
commentaries, and other embodiments of the law in the target lan-
guage.16 Even after an adequate translation has been made, issues of in-
terpretation may arise. Interpretative problems are often complicated by
the different levels of authoritativeness given various versions of the
treaty. An additional complication is the absence of an internationally
established body of law in the area of treaty interpretation.
concepts which are bard to explain to civilians. On the danger of transplanting concepts, see,
e.g., Frank, supra note 4, at 919-20.
10. See Stevens, The Principle of Linguistic Equality in Judicial Proceedings and in the
Interpretation of Plurilingual Legal Instruments: The Regime Linguistique in the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 701, 715 (1967).
11. M. HILF, supra note 6, at 22-23.
12. An additional refinement can be made here based on the purpose of the translation. A
translation may be satisfactory merely for information purposes, but "inadequate and even
harmful in an adversary proceeding conducted with the animus of skilled advocacy." De
Vries, Choice of Language, 3 VA. J. INT'L L. 26, 32 (1963).
13. Stevens, supra note 10, at 720.
14. Id. at 721.
15. Bueckling, The Strategy of Semantics and the Making Provisions of the Space Treaty, 7
J. SPACE L. 15, 16 (1979).
16. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXTS-MATERIALS 819 (4th ed,
1980).
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IMl. AUTHORITATIVENESS OF TREATY TEXTS
There are three types of texts used in the interpretation of interna-
tional treaties: authentic versions, 17 official texts,' 8 and official transla-
tions. 19 These texts represent three progressively decreasing levels of
authoritativeness.20 Since a more authoritative text automatically
prevails over a less authoritative one, the question arises whether an offi-
cial translation has any interpretative value and if so, what its status is as
compared with the other types of text.
Unlike the authentic and official texts, official translations are not an
integral part of the treaty.21 They are usually prepared by a contracting
party, state or international body for its own use.22 Official translations
are often prepared some time after the treaty has been signed. While this
fact does not necessarily reflect on the quality of the version, it must be
kept in mind that official translations are unilaterally prepared docu-
ments23 which have not been negotiated by the parties to the treaty.24
Consequently, when using official translations certain caution is required
in view of the potential difficulties outlined above. 5
Despite these limitations, official translations are used in two ways.
The first use is as a basic instrument. Frequently, domestic courts deal-
ing with international treaties will resort to whatever translation of the
treaty is available in their national language. This approach, although
not in accordance with the general hierarchy of authoritativeness, has
been considered acceptable for purposes of expediency in view of linguis-
17. M. TABORY, MULTILINGUALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAWV AND INsTITUrTONs 37
(1980). For interpretative purposes, authentic texts are binding.
18. Id. Official texts, although signed by the negotiating states, are not accepted as
authoritative.
19. Id Official translations are prepared by the parties, individual governments, or inter-
national organizations.
20. Hardy, The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribu-
nals; 37 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 72, 123 (1961).
21. Id at 136.
22. Id
23. M. HILF, supra note 6, at 106. See also Germer, Interpretation of Plurilingual Trea-
ties: A Study ofArticle 33 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1I HARV. INT'L. LJ.
400,407 (1970); Ivrais, Official Translations of International Instruments Documents; Practice
of the ILO, the LN and the UN, REVUE HELLEIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 217, 247
(1955).
24. In certain situations translations are generated concomitant with the drafting of the
original text, though not authenticated by the parties. In this case there seems to be no ques-
tion that the translation is part of the legislative history and may properly be consulted for
clarification of the original. D6lle, Mehrsprachige Gesetzes- und Vertragstexte, 26 RABIELS
ZErrSCHRIFT 4, 24 (1961).
25. See supra text accompanying notes 4-14.
1985]
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tic difficulties.2 6 One rationale advanced by the school which advocates
an official translation of a treaty as binding is that justice requires that
nationals have access to the text that underlies their courts'
interpretation.27
The second use of official translations is as a supplementary means
of interpretation. When the authentic or official texts are ambiguous or
reveal discrepancies, official translations are often used for guidance in
ascertaining the drafters' intent.2" The rationale behind this use is that at
least one party to the treaty understood the meaning as it appeared in the
official translation. Many authors, however, deny the interpretative
value of official translations in this situation.29 They argue that a transla-
tion into the national language of the user country, not agreed upon by
the parties, has no effect when it conflicts with an authentic text in the
original language.30 While international courts usually adhere to the
authentic version, the situation in domestic courts is often different. The
judge may be bound by municipal law to apply official translations exclu-
sively,31 or he may have the discretion to either totally reject national
translations or use them as a subsidiary means of interpretation. The au-
thoritativeness of official translations in domestic courts has been consid-
ered solely a matter of municipal law.32 However, such a view makes it
virtually impossible to maintain any uniform international law.
A related issue is whether the original version, being the most au-
thoritative, should be consulted automatically whenever its provisions
apply, even though no discrepancies between the original version and the
official translation are noticed and none of the parties raises the issue.33
Theoretically, unless one of the interested parties reveals the existence of
a discrepancy, the tribunal may find itself interpreting an official transla-
tion on the faulty assumption that it accurately reflects the meaning of
the original version of a treaty.34 Thus, a country relying only upon its
official translation of a multilingual treaty should be aware that its con-
duct may in fact be violating the terms of the treaty.35 On the other
26. M. HILF, supra note 6, at 221-22.
27. Dblle, supra note 24, at 32.
28. M. HILF, supra note 6, at 107.
29. Hardy, supra note 20, at 137; see also M. HILF, supra note 6, at 107.
30. See supra note 29; see also A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VbLKERR8CHT
397 (1976); Ivrakis, supra note 23, at 217.
31. M. HILF, supra note 6, at 214-15; see also Hardy, supra note 20, at 136.
32. Hardy, supra note 20, at 138.
33. M. TABORY, supra note 17, at 138.
34. Id. at 199.
35. M. HILF, supra note 6, at 77-80.
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hand, it would be cumbersome for courts to be obligated to resort to a
foreign language whenever treaty provisions are being interpreted.
IV. RULES OF INTERPRETATION
There are two main schools of thought relating to interpretation of
international treaties. One school endorses the textual approach, which
considers the text of a treaty alone to be the authentic expression of the
parties' intent. The other school adopts the contextual approach, which
determines the parties' intent by looking beyond the language of the
treaty to other evidence that aids in its interpretation. Such evidence
might include the circumstances surrounding formation of the treaty,
legislative history, and the travauxprparatoiresa6 The following section
examines these approaches to treaty interpretation and their application
to the Warsaw Convention.
A. The Vienna Convention37
International jurisprudence recognizes several principles of treaty
interpretation. Those holding the status of universal or general rules of
international law have been codified in Articles 31, 32, and 33 of the
Vienna Convention, which largely follows the textual approach.38 Arti-
cle 31 provides that in most instances treaties should be interpreted con-
sidering only the text of the treaty, any supplementary agreements and
instruments, subsequent agreements or practices, and the applicable rules
of international law.39 Supplementary means of interpretation are al-
lowed under Article 32 if the interpretation reached under Article 31
either leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.'
Article 33, which concerns multilingual treaties, is the only article
36. M. TABORY, supra note 17, at 202; Note, Air Law-Foreign Language Treaty Inter-
pretation-Recovery of Damages for Mental Injuries in Airplane Hiackings: Rosman v. Trans
World Airlines, INT'L L. & PoL. 87, 93-95 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rosman Note]. Certain
authors also identify a third, "teleological" approach which focuses on the declared or appar-
ent object of the treaty. See Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Spe-
cial Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic
Conference, 18 IN'L & CoMP. L.Q. 318 (1969).
37. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, May 23,
1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 679 (1969) and 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. For a more detailed listing of the principles that
have not been codified in the Vienna Convention, see Hardy, supra note 20, passim. For their
status after the adoption of the Vienna Convention, see M. TABORY, supra note 17, at 206-08.
38. See Rosman Note, supra note 36, at 93.
39. Vienna Convention, supra note 37, art. 31.
40. Id. art. 32.
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that addresses the problem of language in treaty interpretation. It pro-
vides that an authentic4 text is authoritative and it prescribes rules of
interpretation when discrepancies arise as to the meaning of different
texts. In addition, Article 33.2 provides: "A version of the treaty in a
language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated
shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the
parties so agree."'42 Article 33 is the only provision in the Vienna Con-
vention which implies that unauthenticated versions of a treaty may have
some legal significance. However, Article 33 provides no guidelines as to
the interpretation of such versions.
In its deliberations, the International Law Commission did not ig-
nore the significance of official unauthenticated translations. This issue,
however, was left unresolved because the Commission could not agree
upon a general principle of interpretation that would take into account
the multiplicity of situations.43 Nonetheless, according to certain au-
thors, the Commission's use of the term "version" for an unauthenti-
cated source and "text" for an authentic source 4 suggests that the
Commission intended to distinguish between binding and nonbinding
texts.45 In summary, the Vienna Convention provided no particular gui-
dance to the interpretation of a treaty whose sole authoritative version is
in a foreign language, when the version in dispute is a mere official trans-
lation lacking in interpretative value.
B. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 46 is
another possible source of guidance in the interpretation of official trans-
lations of multilingual treaties. The Restatement is a codification of the
41. Id. art. 33.
42. Id. art. 33, para. 2.
43. M. HILF, supra note 6, at 103.
44. Vienna Convention, supra note 37, art. 10,
The text of a treaty is established as authentic and definitive: (a) by such procedure as
may be provided for in the text or agreed upon by the states participating in its
drawing up; or (b) failing such procedure, by the signature and referendum or initial-
ing by the representatives of those states of the text of the treaty or of the Final Act
of a conference incorporating the text.
Id.
45. M. TABORY, supra note 17, at 171. See also Germer, supra note 23, at 408.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. This was the official version of the Re-
statement in effect at the time of the decisions discussed in this Note. In 1980 the American
Law Institute published a Tentative Revised Draft of the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT Or
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised) (Tent. Draft 1982) [here-
inafter cited as REVISED RESTATEMENT].
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case law and reflects the traditional contextual approach of United States
courts.' Under the Restatement view,48 not only is the ordinary mean-
ing of treaty language considered, but the interpreting body should also
compare the various original language texts "taking into account any
provision in the [Treaty] agreement as to the authoritativeness of the dif-
ferent texts."' 49 Although the Restatement view does not specifically ad-
dress the problem of official translations,50 it would probably permit the
interpreter to examine other sources, such as the authentic version of the
treaty. This is consistent with the prevailing view in international law
that a court has not only the latitude, but also the obligation, to consult
the text of highest authoritativeness.
Under the influence of the Vienna Convention, the Revised Restate-
ment51 adopts a more textual approach which reflects many countries'
unwillingness to reject a literal interpretation of statutes. 52 Under the
Revised Restatement, the drafters' intent is to be ascertained from "the
terms of the agreement in their context."" a Section 330 of the Revised
Restatement54 is similar to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 55 in that
it allows supplementary means of interpretation where the result ob-
tained either "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. ' 56 Consequently, the
guidance furnished by the Restatement is as inconclusive as that pro-
vided by the Vienna Convention.
C. Judicial Decisions
Although the United States Supreme Court has not decided a case
involving interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, some guidance can
be derived from the court's holding in Todok v. Union State Bank. 7 The
Todok case established the principle that when a treaty is drafted in only
one language, that language is controlling in the resolution of any dis-
putes arising under the treaty. Todok involved the interpretation of a
47. Rosman Note, supra note 36, at 97-98.
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 147.
49. I'7 § 147 (1).
50. Id § 147. Comment (I) mentions that no authority has been found dealing with ver-
sions in a language not stated in the agreement to be authoritative.
51. REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 46.
52. Id § 329, Reporter's note 1. "Statutes" in this context also includes treaties.
53. Id. § 329.
54. Id § 330.
55. Vienna Convention, supra note 37, art. 31.
56. REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 330.
57. Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930).
19851
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
treaty drafted solely in French. The term 'fonds et biens" had accu-
rately been translated as "goods and effects." However, the Court in-
quired beyond this translation and found that the civil-law usage of
"biens" included real estate, whereas "goods" under United States com-
mon law referred only to chattels."8 Thus the Supreme Court based its
interpretation of the treaty on the French legal meaning of a treaty term.
The landmark decision regarding the proper interpretation of the
Warsaw Convention is Block v. Air France,9 which involved an airplane
crash upon take-off at Orly Airport in Paris. The plaintiff's main conten-
tion was that the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to any case was
premised on the existence of a contract and that the framers had not
envisaged an aircraft charter to be a direct contractual relation between a
passenger and an airline.6 °
The Fifth Circuit approached its interpretative task by observing
that "the underlying concepts are civilian in origin."61 The fact that the
Convention was drafted exclusively in French62 was seen by the Fifth
Circuit as a clear indication that the drafters intended the French legal
meaning to be binding.63 In order to arrive at the proper interpretation,
the court consulted the civil-law meaning of the word "contract" and the
minutes of the Convention to determine the legislative intent. The court
noted that the civil-law meaning of "contract" differs from the common-
law meaning because it does not require mutual consideration. The only
elements needed to establish a contract of carriage under civil law are a
promise by the carrier to transport the passenger and the passenger's
consent. 64 Based on the legislative history of the Warsaw Convention
and the court's inquiry into the civil-law use of the controverted terms,
the court found that, contrary to Block's contention, a contract had been
formed which effectively brought the case within the purview of the War-
saw Convention.
The basic interpretative principles laid down in Block have been
cited with approval and extensively followed by many United States and
58. Id. at 454.
59. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 905 (1968).
60. The Warsaw Convention applies on its face only to two party contractual relations.
For a general discussion of Block, see Note, Warsaw Convention-A Limited Liability-Voy-
age Character: Block v. Air France, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 643, 644 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Block Note].
61. Block, 386 F.2d at 331.
62. Id. at 330.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 330-31.
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foreign courts.6- As a general rule, under Block the court has an obliga-
tion to keep a treaty's interpretation as uniform as possible in accordance
with the intent of the framers.66 In the case of the Warsaw Convention,
this harmonizing construction can be attained by giving primacy to the
French legal meaning of the treaty's terms,67 and by considering, when
appropriate, the treaty's legislative history and relevant extrinsic aids.63
A court may also look for guidance to judicial decisions of other coun-
tries69 and consult the additional protocols and amendments, 70 as subse-
quent actions of the signatories may clarify intent.7 ' Both the
Restatement72 and the Vienna Convention73 support this view.
One example of such subsequent action is the Guatemala City Pro-
tocol.74 In the Protocol, the term "wounding and bodily injury" was
65. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977); Day v. TWA, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.
1975); Rosman v. TWA, 34 N.Y.2d. 385 (1974); Palagonia v. TWA, 442 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1978);
FothergiU v. Monarch Airlines, [1980] 2 All E. R. 696.
66. Block, 386 F.2d at 338.
67. Id. at 330-32.
68. Id. at 335.
69. Husserl v. Swiss Air, 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Husserl II].
70. The Warsaw Convention has been amended several times. The Montreal Agreement
of 1966 requires that passengers be given notice that the Warsaw Convention applies to per-
sonal injury rather than merely to "bodily injury." The Montreal Agreement left the French
text unchanged. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention was not similarly modified until the
Guatemala City Protocol of 1971. One court has interpreted this change to mean that lision
corporelle encompasses nervous shock and mental suffering. See Husserl v. Swiss Air, 351 F.
Supp. 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Husserl I].
Although the Guatemala City Protocol has not been ratified by the United States Senate,
it is relevant that the United States plenipotentiaries approved and signed the Protocol after
having participated in the framing and the drafting of the text. IL MANr1EW!CZ, supra note 7,
at 189-92. Although ratification of such an amendment by the United States would make it
part of the Convention and as such the "law of the land," even in instances in which the
United States is not a party to the amended version, such action is evidence of the parties'
intent.
71. Id. See eg., Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918-19 (2d Cir.
1978) (stating "More compelling is the evidence of how other signatories of the [Warsaw]
Convention have interpreted its provisions .... [Me do find the opinions of our sister signa-
tories to be entitled to considerable weight"). See also Day, 528 F.2d at 35; Choctaw Nation of
Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943).
72. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 147. Factors to be considered in the interpretative
process include "the subsequent practice of the parties in the performance of the agreement."
73. Vienna Convention, supra note 37,
There shall be taken into account, together with the context (a) any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the appli-
cation of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.
Id Art. 31(3)(b).
74. See infra note 83.
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substituted by "personal injury," while the French "ldsion corporelle"
was left unchanged. This has been regarded as evidence of the con-
tracting parties' intent that recovery should not be limited to damages for
physical harm and resulting mental harm, but rather should encompass
any kind of personal injury-including mental harm which does not stem
from physical injury.75
Another issue faced by the courts is whether the treaty's provisions
should be interpreted in light of the conditions in 1929, when the treaty
was drafted, or in light of current conditions. One view suggests that a
treaty should be interpreted with "regard to the context in which the
agreement was made."76 This procedure is followed in a number of deci-
sions. 7 The opposite view has also had substantial support, both from
commentators and in judicial decisions. This forward-looking interpreta-
tion78 finds its clearest expression in cases such as Reed v. Wiser79 and
Day v. Trans World Airlines."° As the Day court noted, "conditions and
new methods may arise not present at the precise moment of drafting.
For a court to view a treaty as frozen in the year of its creation is scarcely
more justifiable than to regard the Constitutional clock as forever
stopped in 1787. ' '81 This analogy, of course, may be applied persuasively
to treaty interpretation. "The plain meaning of the treaty must be adapt-
able to the practical exigencies of air travel in these parlous times."
'82 Of
course, for situations that were unanticipated when a treaty was drafted,
"a prime canon of treaty construction is to look at the subsequent action
of the parties."' 83 Given these differing views in the particular circum-
stances of the Warsaw Convention, the question is which French legal
meaning is binding: the one of 1929 or the present meaning? So far this
question remains unanswered.
75. See supra text accompanying note 73.
76. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 147.
77. For example, the court in Palagonia looked at the French meaning of lision corporelle
at approximately the time the Warsaw Convention was signed. One of the documents ex-
amined was a writing dated 1930 by George Ripert, one of the drafters of the Warsaw Conven-
tion; another was a doctoral thesis supervised by Ripert, published in 1933.
78. R. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER
22 (1981).
79. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
80. Day v. TWA, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
81. Id. at 35.
82. Id.
83. "An international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework
of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation." A. VERDROSS & B.
SIMMA, supra note 30, at 396.
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V. THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND ITS
INTERPRETATION
The Warsaw Convention was signed by twenty-three countries in
1929.84 Its provisions embody two main objectives: To provide uniform
rules relating to air transportation, and to limit air carrier liability for
accidents associated with air travel.8 5 To achieve uniformity, the original
signatories drafted the Warsaw Convention in French86 and deposited a
single copy with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland. 7
Since the Convention was signed, however, commentators have ex-
pressed concern that diverging national judicial decisions have disrupted
uniform application of the Convention."8 The fact that the Warsaw Con-
vention presently operates in diverse legal systems is one reason for this
phenomenon.89 This problem is particularly acute in common-law coun-
tries,90 where the common-law meaning of a term may differ from its
French civil-law meaning.
The United States was neither represented at, nor an original signa-
tory of, the Warsaw Convention. The United States did not even adhere
to the treaty until 1934.91 An English translation of the treaty, provided
by the Department of State, accompanied a copy of the original French
version when the United States Senate debated and ratified the treaty.
While United States courts have not expressly recognized this English
version as controlling, this version has been used in a quasi-official man-
ner in all considerations of the Warsaw Convention.92 This creates
problems because courts in the United States and other countries differ in
the interpretative procedure of the Warsaw Convention. This is largely
84. With the exception of Great Britain (including British dominions), the original signa-
tories were all civil-law countries. Warsaw Convention, supra note I.
85. The maximum recovery for an air travel related accident was originally set by the
Convention at 125,000 PoincarE Francs (about S8,300), subsequently increased to S75,000 by
the Montreal Agreement (1966), and later to S100,000 by the Guatemala Protocol (1971)
which has not yet been ratified by the United States. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497 (1967).
86. At that time French was the predominant language in international relations.
87. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 36.
88. Mankiewicz, Diversification of Uniform Private Law Conventions. 21 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 718, passim (1972).
89. Id. at 722. The Warsaw Convention also has certain "built-in' sources of disunilica-
tion such as references to national and local law. Id. at 722.
90. To a certain degree these problems also arise among civil-law countries. See M. HiL:,
supra note 6, at 206-10.
91. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1.
92. McKenry, Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29 J. AIR L & Coi..
205, 207 (1963).
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due to the absence of generally accepted international rules of treaty
interpretation.
As previously discussed, the provisions of the Warsaw Convention
resulted primarily from deliberations of jurists from civil-law countries.
93
Thus, the legal concepts used in the French text are necessarily civil-law
concepts. United States courts have resorted to the English version in
interpreting the Warsaw Convention because it is cumbersome to inter-
pret foreign language documents.94 Nonetheless, the doctrinally correct
process is to seek guidance in the French original.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,"
the Warsaw Convention is the supreme law of the land 96 and thereby
supersedes contrary state and local laws.9 7 Because the United States did
not become a signatory party to the Warsaw Convention until five years
after its creation, the original French version was submitted for ratifica-
tion to the Senate. This version was published in the Statutes at Large9"
as the official text of the Convention. Thus the Warsaw Convention has
been adopted as the law of the land in its French version.99 Conse-
quently, when a term of the treaty is in dispute, the courts are required to
take judicial notice of the original French version. °°
Because official translations are generally accorded no interpretative
value whatsoever,10 there is a danger in deviating from the meaning of
an original treaty text when an official translation provides the sole basis
for interpreting the treaty. The following steps would resolve this
problem.
93. The text of the Warsaw Convention was the outcome of the international conferences
held in Paris (1925) and Warsaw (1929) and the work of the interim Commild International
Technique d'Experts Juridiques Airiens (Citeja). Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 85, at
498.
94. The use of official translations for the convenience of the courts is a generally accepted
practice. See D81le, supra note 24.
95. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
96. See, ag., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 302 (1942); Todok v. Union State Bank, 281
U.S. 449 (1929); Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971).
97. In many countries, however, the courts are not held to the French texts, but apply the
official translation which has the force of law because of its incorporation into a statute. The
U.K. Carriage by Air Acts of 1932 and 1961, the German Air Transport Act of 1965, the
Swiss Air Transport Regulation of 1952. R. MANKIEWICZ, supra note 7, at 194.
98. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1.
99. See, e.g., Palagonia v. TWA, 442 N.Y. S.2d 670, 110 Misc. 2d 478 (1978).
100. Rosman v. TWA, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 392 (1974).
101. See, e.g., cases mentioned in note 65 supra. It appears that the English translation
used by the courts is a fairly accurate rendition of the French text. If there were any errors in
the translation, they have since been removed. On the procedure of eliminating errors in an
international treaty text, see A. ORAISON, L'ERREUR DANS LES TRAITtS (1972); Vienna Con-
vention, supra note 37, art. 79.
[Vol. 8
Recovery for Mental Harm
First, the accuracy of the translation itself must be ascertained. This
can be done by comparing not only the language on a purely linguistic
level, but also the legal connotations of the phrase(s) in dispute. Once it
has been determined that a translation is accurate, courts can use this
translation.102 Because a translation is not the authoritative version in
many cases, however, the legal meaning of language which is in dispute
must be ascertained according to its civil-law usage. For example, in
Palagonia, claims for personal injury and mental anguish were alleged to
have arisen out of an air traffic accident. Since the Warsaw Convention
allows recovery for the "wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury,"10' one of the issues in Palagonia was whether "bodily injury"
included mental harm. Defendant produced as an expert a world re-
nowned French linguist, professor of lexicology and semantics, and au-
thor of numerous books. Relying on certain dictionaries, the expert
testified that "bodily injury" was an accurate translation of the French
"ldsion corporelle." However, this information did not dispose of the
question whether the French legal meaning of "lision corporelle" encom-
passed a connotation of mental harm.
To determine the existence of this connotation, the second step, that
is an ascertainment of the legal meaning under civil-law usage, must be
performed. To do this, a variety of means are available, including pres-
entation of expert witnesses and examination of the French Civil Code,
French legal treatises and legal dictionaries."° Courts should also look
at the subsequent practice of the parties to the Convention, judicial deci-
sions in other countries, and protocols and amendments of the Conven-
tion text. Frequently the history of a treaty, the travaux prdparatoires,
will be helpful 05 All of these sources constitute supplementary means
of interpretation. Thus, this process raises a further question as to what
extent the rules of treaty interpretation allow for consultation of such
outside sources and how, as a practical matter, courts resolve this
question. 106
Finally, it must be determined which version of the treaty is control-
102. 442 N.Y.S.2d 670.
103. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17. The French version of Article 17 is "bles-
sure ou [ . .1 toute autre I'sion corporelle." Id
104. In certain instances such attempts to ascertain the French legal meaning have been
misconstrued as choice-of-law questions. See eg., Rosman v. TWA, 34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974);
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
105. The term "travauxprparatoires" has been defined as "material constituting the devel-
opment and negotiation of an agreement." REsTATEmENT, supra note 46, § 329, Reporter's
Note 1.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 59-97.
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ling when there is a discrepancy in the meaning of a term. According to
the generally accepted rules regarding the authoritativeness of treaty
texts, the French version should control in the event of either a linguistic
or legal discrepancy. Unfortunately, the courts have not gone through
this analytical process in interpreting the Warsaw Convention, and as
will be illustrated below, there is some disagreement among the courts as
to the resolution of this question.
VI. INTERPRETATION OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION BY UNITED STATES COURTS
In view of the analysis suggested above and the rules of interpreta-
tion presented, the cases interpreting the Warsaw Convention fall
roughly into two main groups. The first consists of cases that essentially
follow the rules laid down in Block. These cases go through all the steps
of the analysis, that is, in cases of controversy the civil-law usage of the
French legal term 7 is examined and given effect. The second group of
cases departs from the Block approach for a variety of reasons.10 8 The
common element of the second group is that they all involve claims for
mental anguish under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. 10 9 There-
fore they raise the common question of whether the wording of Article
17 allowing recovery for "wounding and bodily injury" includes recovery
for mental anguish.
A. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines
In 1974 the New York Court of Appeals decided Rosman v. Trans
World Airlines. 10 The controversy in Rosman centered around the
meaning of "bodily injury" and "wounding." Plaintiff contended that
"bodily injury," or alternatively, "wounding" encompassed both physical
and mental injury or harm. Thus the question arose as to whether a
hearing to determine the French legal meaning would be appropriate. 11
107. See, eg., Husserl I, 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Palagonia, 442 N.Y.S.2d 670
(1978).
108. See. e.g., Rosman, 34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974); Husserl 11, 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
109. "The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wound-
ing of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which
caused the damage so sustained took place on board." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art.
17.
110. Rosman was a consolidated action before the Court of Appeals of New York which
issued a decision concerning both Rosman v. TWA, 338 N.Y.2d 664 (1972) and Herman v.
TWA, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1972).
111. New York CPLR 4511 requires that judicial notice be taken of laws of foreign coun-
[Vol. 8
Recovery for Mental Harm
The court denied a hearing on the ground that an accurate English trans-
lation of the Warsaw Convention had been agreed upon by the parties. 2
This translation presupposed that "bodily injury" was an accurate rendi-
tion of the French "lsion corporelle," without further examining the
connotations of each term. The opinion cites a number of cases which
also declined to resort to such a hearing. The court then proceeded to
examine the meaning of "bodily injury" in English by contrasting it to
"mental injury." The court concluded that plaintiffs could recover dam-
ages for all palpable physical injuries, whether from mental or physical
cause, and for mental damages resulting from bodily injury.
The opinion adopts the view of Section 146 of the Restatement'
1 3
which states that the meaning intended by the parties is to be ascertained
from the treaty's text, its context, and the circumstances of the treaty
conclusion.' 14 The Court ignores, however, that the text of the agree-
ment is merely one of the factors to be considered and that the Restate-
ment allows virtually any kind of relevant evidence to be considered. 115
Under the Restai, ment, such evidence may include a "comparison of the
texts in the different languages in which the agreement was concluded,
taking into account any provision in the agreement as to the authorita-
tiveness of the different texts.""1 6 It has been suggested that the proper
procedure to be followed is to comply with the Restatement's command
regarding authoritativeness by applying the interpretative procedure to
the French text rather than to the English translation." 7
It is clear that the interpretative approach used in Rosman deviates
from the venerable rule laid down in Todok.'" Since the Supreme Court
found an inquiry into the French legal meaning warranted, little justifica-
tion appears for the deviation, notwithstanding the fact that an accurate
translation had been reached. Inquiry into the French legal meaning can
be justified, even under the Vienna Convention."19 Under Article 33.2,120
only authenticated versions are authoritative, and thus the court would
be required to rely on the French text. Supplementary means of interpre-
tries if a party requests it and, in determining what law should be judically noticed, allows a
court to consider any testimony, document, information, or argument on the subject, whether
offered by a party or discovered through its own research.
112. 34 N.Y.2d at 394-95.
113. 1d at 395, n.9.
114. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 146.
115. IdL
116. Id. § 147(1) (1).
117. Note, Rosman v. TWA, INT'L LAw & Pot. 87, 98 (1975).
118. Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1929).
119. Vienna Convention, supra note 37.
120. Id art. 33.2.
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tation are allowed by Article 32(a) if the basic procedure enunciated in
Article 31 "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure."' 21 Of course, it
is arguable that no dispute remains since the opinion quite clearly states
that the parties agreed on the accuracy of the translation. On the other
hand, the court also acknowledged that the parties "would attach differ-
ent connotations to the terms."1 22 This should be sufficient ambiguity
within the meaning of Article 32 to demand recourse to supplementary
sources.
The Rosman court also failed to look for guidance in the subsequent
actions of the signatories. The Guatemala City Protocol had been signed
three years before this decision and, although it was not ratified by the
United States, as a subsequent action of the parties to the treaty, it consti-
tuted a valuable means of elucidating the intended meaning of the
term. 1
23
A possible explanation for the court's reluctance to inquire into the
French legal meaning lies in the fact that it apparently failed to recognize
this analysis as a supplementary means of interpretation. The court in-
stead made certain allusions to choice-of-law questions.'24 Although it
acknowledged that the question is not one of applying internal French
law, 125 the court refused to "revert to a quest of past or present French
law to be applied."' 26 As the court noted "[i]t does not follow from the
fact that the treaty is written in French, that in interpreting it we are
forever chained to French law."'
127
It must be kept in mind that one of the two purposes of the Warsaw
Convention was to achieve uniformity of the law relating to air transpor-
tation. This explains the "utter hostility which was displayed by the
Conference relating to conflicts of laws solutions."'' 21 In fact, in the text
of the Convention, the Conference expressly left only four instances to be
governed by the law of the tribunal seized of the dispute. 129 With these
limited exceptions, whenever the Warsaw Convention applies, its provi-
121. Id. arts. 31, 32(a).
122. 34 N.Y.2d at 394.
123. See supra note 83.
124. For a view that this is a choice-of-law question, see Note, Block v. Air France, 34 1,
AIR L. & COMM. 643, 650 (1968).
125. 34 N.Y.2d at 394.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 386 F.2d at 330 (citing SUNDBERG, AIR CHARTER: A STUDY IN LEGAL DEVELOP-
MENT 261-62 (1961)).
129. These articles are 21, 25, 28(2) and 29. Verplaetse, From Warsaw to the French Cour
de Cassation: Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, 36 J. AIR L. & COMM. 50 (1970).
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sions are the "law of the land" and no choice of law is involved.1 30 Of
course, in order to determine the proper meaning of the law of the land,
the meaning of the original French version of the Warsaw Convention
must be ascertained first. 31 It does not follow, as the Rosman court
feared, that "we are forever chained to French law."1 32 The question is
merely one of considering the French legal usage as a supplementary
means of interpretation.1
33
The interpretative procedure followed by the Rosman court is un-
doubtedly incorrect in light of the previously cited authorities. 3 It has
been suggested that had the court recognized the French legal meaning
as binding and examined the French usage of "lsion corporelle"135 the
final result would have been the same.1 36 On the contrary, in light of
later decisions 137 and comments1 3 1 it is clear that correct interpretative
procedure would have yielded the opposite result.
B. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.
The interpretative approach taken in Rosman was followed by the
court in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. 139 In Husserl, plaintiff alleged
that she had sustained both bodily injury and mental pain and anguish
when she was detained on board defendant's airplane during a hijacking.
Accordingly, she brought an action for damages. The case came before
the court twice on summary judgment motions.
The court in Husserl I followed the interpretative approach enunci-
130. See also Mankiewicz, Conflicting Interpretations of the lVarsaw Air Transport Treaty,
18 AM. J. CoMp. L. 177, 178 (1970).
131. Burnett v. TWA, 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.C.N.M. 1973).
132. 34 N.Y.2d at 395.
133. But the mere adoption of a language may in itself come very close to a choice of law.
De Vries, Choice ofLanguage, 3 VA. J. INT'L L. 26 (1963). Under this theory it can be argued
that the fact that the French text was meant to be controlling constitutes to a limited extent a
choice of law.
134. See text accompanying notes 109-14.
135. One explanation given for the interpretative procedure followed by the Rosman court
is the fact that the parties stipulated that "bodily injury" is the correct translation of "1Mion
corporelle" and a New York CPLR 4511 hearing would not be conducted unless one of the
parties requested it. See R. MAswEwxcz, supra note 78, at 193.
136. Note, supra note 117, at 105-06.
137. See, e.g., Palagonia v. TWA, 442 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1978).
138. See, e.g., Husseri I v. Swiss Air Transport, 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In the
first motion defendants argued that hijacking was not an accident within the Warsaw Conven-
tion's liability provisions. The court dismissed the motion, holding that hijacking may be con-
strued to be an accident within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. For a discussion of
the case, see generally Note, Husserl v. Swiss Air, 39 . AIR L & CoMM. 445 (1973).
139. Husserl II v. Swiss Air Transport, 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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ated in Block.1" Recognizing the French legal meaning as binding, the
court examined the French Text of Article 17 which was at issue in the
case. A French legal dictionary indicated that the word blessure encom-
passed not only a physical wound, but also any other hurt or injury.4,
The court, however, held that the meaning of the word was controlled by
the phrase which followed it - toute autre lision corporelle. When ana-
lyzed in this context, the court concluded that mental anguish and suf-
fering were not included within the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention.142 As further support for this position, the opinion noted
that the English version of the Guatemala City Protocol substituted
"personal injury" for the term "wounding and bodily injury" and left the
French "lision corporelle" unchanged.
The efforts made in Guatemala City to clarify the term "ldsion
corporelle" are noted by a leading authority in the field."4 3 "On two oc-
casions, namely at The Hague and in Guatemala City, eminent lawyers
from French speaking civil law countries and English speaking common
law countries agreed and affimed . . . that the meaning of ldsion
corporelle in French civil law is the same as that of 'personal injury' in
the common law and vice versa." 144
Three years later, Husserl again came before the court (Husserl
I1). 145 Most likely under the influence of the Rosman decision, Husserl
I1 adopted the opposite interpretative position. Conceding that the
United States had adhered to the French text of the Convention, the
court held that this did not mean that the French legal meaning of the
words or the French legal interpretation of the treaty was binding. 1
46
Husserl II challenged the authority of cases such as Todok and
Block, whose holdings had been followed by all subsequent decisions,
including Rosman. 47 The opinion argued that the "language was merely
intended to express the common understanding of the drafters in a com-
140. 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967).
141. The relevant part of the French version of Article 17 is "blessure ou de toute autre
lsion corporelle' The English translation of this language is: "or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
142. 351 F. Supp. at 708.
143. R.H. Mankiewicz (for a description of his qualifications see 442 N.Y. S.2d at 672).
144. Id.
145. In this second summary judgment motion, defendants argued that mental anguish was
not a compensable injury under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The motion was
denied.
146. 388 F. Supp. at 1249.
147. The Rosman court pays lip service to the rule of Todok and Block but concludes that
there is "no suggestion in the treaty that French law was intended to govern the meaning of
Warsaw's terms."
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mon international language so that confusion would be limited and could
be resolved to some extent by reference to the common meaning of one
international language."14 Subsequently, the court determined that the
intent of the drafters was for the Warsaw Convention to apply to both
physical and mental injuries. The court reasoned that had the drafters
been aware of the ambiguity in the text, they would have clearly stated
that the Convention applied to mental as well as physical injuries.'4 9
Based upon this analysis, the Husserl II court concluded that Article 17
includes mental as well as physical injuries. 5 '
The approach taken by the Husser II court can be criticized. If
contracting states may freely substitute their own national interpretation
of the Warsaw Convention for the original French text, the Convention's
fundamental goal of uniformity in judicial interpretation of cases involv-
ing air transportation would be severely undermined. It has been sug-
gested that Husserl II offends established principles of treaty
interpretation under international law.' Indeed, the court ignored not
only the methods of treaty interpretation prescribed by Articles 31
through 33 of the Vienna Convention, but also the principle that a party
may not invoke the provisions of its national law to justify its failure to
perform a treaty.' 52 The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law pro-
vides that,
the duty of a state to give effect to the terms of an international agree-
ment to which it is a party.. . is not affected by a provision of its
domestic law that is in conflict with the agreement or by the absence of
domestic law necessary for it to give effect to the terms of the
agreement. 1
53
Paradoxically, the court in Husserl II reached the correct result notwith-
standing its reliance upon erroneous principles of treaty interpretation.
Husserl I applied the correct principles of treaty interpretation, yet
reached the wrong result. 5 '
C. Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines
The court in Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines also considered the
148. Id.
149. See Note, Husserl v. Swiss Air, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 108, 118 (1975).
150. 388 F. Supp. at 1253.
151. Note, Husserl v. Swiss Air, 6 GA. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 346 (1976).
152. Vienna Convention, supra note 37, art. 27: "A party may not invoke the provisions of
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
153. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 140.
154. R. MANKmwicZ, supra note 7, at 199.
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meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.' 55 The claim in
Palagonia also arose out of a hijacking incident on an international flight,
and, as in Rosman and Husserl I and I/, plaintiffs sought damages purely
for mental agony. The issue again was whether the expression "bodily
injury" encompassed a mental element and whether recovery should be
allowed even in the absence of concomitant physical manifestations.
Faced with conflicting interpretations of "bodily injury" in Husserl I
and Rosman on the one hand, and Husserl 11 on the other, the Palagonia
court followed the generally accepted principles of treaty interpretation
and the rules laid down in Block and made an extensive inquiry into the
French legal meaning of "lision corporelle."
Recognizing that the English version of the Warsaw Convention is
only an unofficial translation' 56 and not authoritative, the court stated
that its inquiry was limited to the meaning of the French text. 157 The
court concluded that the literal translation of "ldsion corporelle" in the
French text as "bodily injury" was not an accurate translation of the
term as used in a French legal document.1 58
In ascertaining the French legal connotation, the court stated that
the "French text was drafted primarily by experts who were used to
working in concepts of the Civil Law, and it is necessary that phrases be
examined for their meaning in the context of the legal usage."' 15 9 This
inquiry was effectuated by means of a hearing 161 which allowed the court
to take judicial notice of relevant evidence at the parties' request. Testi-
mony presented by plaintiff's witness, Professor Mankiewicz who, as a
leading expert on the Warsaw Convention and Aviation Law, was recog-
nized by the court as uniquely qualified to testify,16 contributed substan-
tially to the clarification of the expression at issue. Based on personal
knowledge and experience as well as on writings by some of the drafters
of the Warsaw Convention' 62 dated shortly after it was signed, his testi-
mony contributed substantially to the clarification of the expression at
155. 442 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1978).
156. "Unofficial" in the sense that this version is not adopted by the convention; however
the court refers to what has been termed "official translation" for the purposes of this Note.
157. 442 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
158. Id. at 673.
159. Id. at 672-73.
160. CPLR 4511, supra note 112.
161. 442 N.Y.S.2d at 676. It should be noted that plaintiffs expert witness was well ac-
quainted with the French language and the French law, particularly in the field of air law.
While defendant's witness was equally an expert on the Warsaw Convention, the court found
that he lacked "practical experience in either the study of or practice in French law or the
French legal usage of technical terms."
162. Id. at 673.
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issue. It was shown that lsion corporelle, as well as its German
equivalent Kdrperverletzung, were understood to include mental injury in
the legal usage of both countries.163 This seems to be conclusive evidence
as to both the drafters' intent and the French legal usage. Thus, the
findings in this case implicitly give the solution the Rosman and Husserl
courts sought. Presumably a hearing by the Rosman court would have
yielded the same result.
VII. CONCLUSION
A review of the sequence of opinions discussed above raises the fol-
lowing questions. First, does Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention allow
recovery for mental anguish alone, absent some physical consequences or
an initial physical impact? Second, since two of the cases discussed 64
arrived at the same result using entirely different interpretative methods,
what is the correct procedure to be followed by a court in this situation,
and what arguments can be advanced in support of the view chosen?
To answer the first question, a look at the French law of damages is
warranted. In French civil actions three types of damages are recover-
able: 1) Dommage matdriel allows recovery for damage to the pa-
trimoine, L., property and economic interests; 2) dommage moral covers
fundamental rights outside the patrimoine such as honor and reputation,
and 3) dommage corporel which overlaps with both the first and second
categories and covers material and moral damages, such as moral suffer-
ing from loss of attractiveness due to permanent scars. 65 Thus, the com-
mon-law dichotomy of physical and mental injury is not necessarily valid
under French law since corporel may include physical, moral, and mental
elements.
The term "ldsion" on the other hand, does not cause much contro-
versy. The dictionary defines it as "injury, damage, prejudice or
163. I at 673-74.
164. Palagonia, 442 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1978) and Husserll , 388 F.2d 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
165. "L'antithse classique est celle du dommage matdriel et du dommage moraL Mats une
troisime catigorie s'est aujourd'hui ditachie des pricedents" le dommage corporel. qui a des
aspects d la fois matiriels et moraux. [Le dommage corporel consiste] dans une atteinte d la
santi ou d I'integritd physique let comporte] d c6ti des prjudices matiriels un prejudice moraL "
J. CARBONNIER, DRorr CrvIL 306, 308 (1969). English translation: "The classical antithesis
is that of material damage and moral damage. But nowadays a third category has emerged
from the precedents: corporal damage, which has both material and moral aspects. [Corporal
damage consists] of an invasion of health or physical integrity and [contains] besides these
material harms also a moral harm."
1985]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
wrong."' 66 This broad definition justifies giving it both a concrete and an
abstract interpretation. Thus, the French legal usage "ldsion corporelle"
could refer to mental suffering since it covers "any injury suffered by the
plaintiff as a person distinct from any injury done to his patrimony, i.e.,
his belongings, economic assets or interests."'
' 67
Applied to the Warsaw Convention, one author states that "the use
of the word 'lesion' after the words 'death or wounding' comprises and
contemplates cases of traumatism or disturbance of the mind which do
not immediately become manifest, but have a causal relationship with the
accident."'' 68 French law has recognized this cause of action as far back
as 1857.169 Consequently, whether one adopts the view that the legal
usage in 1929 or the present usage should govern, the French term "ld-
sion corporelle" appears to encompass a mental element. Thus, Article
17 allows recovery for mental suffering alone. The fact that under
French law aviation accidents are governed by contract law does not de-
tract from this conclusion because damages for mental distress in con-
tract cases are liberally allowed.
70
While prior decisions in United States courts' 7' have held that
mental injuries alone were recoverable, these holdings were based on
statutory construction of the English text of the Warsaw Convention. 172
Palagonia was the first decision to hold that mental injuries alone were
recoverable on the ground that the correct translation of "ldsion
corporelle" is "personal injury" or "injury to the person," rather than
"bodily injury" as originally construed by the courts. 173 Relying on the
French legal usage to determine the accuracy of the translation,174 the
court concluded that the translation was incorrect, at least to the extent
that "lision corporelle" has a much broader meaning than would custom-
166. J. JERAUTE, VOCABULAIRE FRANgAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIS-FRAN( AIS DE TERMES
ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES (1953).
167. Id. at 146. See also Miller, Compensable Damages Under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention, 1 AIR L. 210, 211-13 (1976).
168. Mankiewicz, supra note 8, at 201 (quoting from the doctoral thesis of Yvonne J.
Blanc-Dannery entitled La Convention de Varsovie et les rigies du transport adrien
international).
169. Id.
170. H. & L. MAZEAUD & A. TUNc, TRAITfI TH-ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPON-
SABILITA CIVILE 413, 416 (1957).
171. Husserl II v. Swiss Air Transport, 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Krystal v.
British Overseas Airways, 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
172. Comment, Palagonia v. TWA, 4 AIR L. 102 (1979).
173. Id.
174. Id. The author of the cited article, attorney for plaintiff in Palagonia, notes that plain-
tiff was put on notice of the apparent improper translation by an article by Georgette Miller.
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arily be attached to "bodily injury." In view of the authoritativeness of
the text, the French legal meaning was recognized as binding.
Although the different interpretative procedures followed in
Palagonia and Husserl I yielded the same result, it is quite conceivable
that in other circumstances opposite results could occur. 175 Therefore, it
is advisable that a uniform procedure be consistently followed. For the
following reasons, the procedure adopted in Palagonia is most
appropriate. 1
76
First, the Palagonia approach is substantially in accordance with the
rules of treaty interpretation. In litigation involving the Warsaw Con-
vention, these rules would prohibit the use of the English translation as a
sole basis of interpretation, since it is not an authentic text. Also,
Palagonia allows a court to consult supplemental means of interpretation
and in particular, to inquire into the French legal meaning of a term in
dispute. Second, the Convention was negotiated and drafted by Euro-
pean jurists trained in civil law, in the language of a civil-law country.
Nonetheless, United States courts are attempting to make civil-law terms
fit common-law concepts. The potential problem of varying interpreta-
tions of the Warsaw Convention in different legal systems was not ig-
nored by its drafters. By drafting the original in French, the drafters
clearly intended for that version to be of the highest degree of authority.
In this respect, the statement of the British representative 77 to the War-
saw Convention is particularly significant: "In several instances the draft
is contrary to our laws and our customs, but we have decided to make
sacrifices for the sake of this uniformity of rules."'"
Finally, one of the primary purposes of the drafters of the Warsaw
175. One line of decisions predicates its analysis on the fact that the Warsaw Convention
fails to create a cause of action. See, eg., Husserl II, 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Under this view the damages available would be based on conflicts-of-law rules and New York
law provides an action for mental and psychosomatic injuries. The present analysis, however,
is based on the premise that the Warsaw Convention supplies an independent cause of action.
This view is supported by the holding in Benjamins v. BEA, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978).
Therefore it is not necessary to look beyond the provisions of the treaty. For a thorough
analysis of the cause of action question, see Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Jarsaw
Convention, 26 J. AIR L. & COMM. 217 (1959).
176. The opposite approach is not without support. See, eg., Schoner, Die internationale
Rechtsprechung zum Warschauer Abkommen in den Jahren 1974-76, 26 ZErr cHRIFr FOR
LuFr- UND WELTRAUMRECHT 256 (1977). While the author strongly supports the Rosman
decision, he nonetheless advocates the idea that it is essential to ensure that the translation
coincides with the original and the interpretation reached should certainly not be opposed to
the French legal meaning. Id at 260.
177. Sir Alfred Denis represented Great Britain, Australia and Canada at the Warsaw
Convention.
178. R. MANKIEWICZ, supra note 78, at 199.
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Convention was to ensure uniformity of rules regulating international air
transportation. The French text drawn up in a single copy was adhered
to by over one hundred countries and was clearly meant to control and
thus to ensure harmonizing constructions by other signatory countries.
If every signatory relied solely upon its own translation, as the Rosman
and Husserl courts did, the number of differing interpretations generated
would be equal to the number of members using these versions. This
would obviously frustrate the drafters' intent by diluting or even destroy-
ing the purpose of the treaty.
179
In view of the foregoing considerations, both theoretical and practi-
cal, in cases involving interpretation of the Warsaw Convention it is
therefore desirable to employ the interpretative rules followed by the
court in Palagonia.8 0
179. Note, Reed v. Wiser, 44 J. AIR L. & COMM. 175, 185 (1978). The practical signifl-
cance of this concern is articulated in the FAA Administrator's statement before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee: "The Warsaw Convention, by providing a uniform rule of law
which governs the relationship of the airline operator and his passenger or shipper. . . has for
almost 40 years provided a degree of certainty making it possible for the individual passenger
or shipper and the airline operator to be reasonably certain what their legal relationship is, and
to act accordingly." 555 F.2d at 1091.
180. 442 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1978). This approach seems to be endorsed by the Supreme Court
in its recent decision in Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985). There the Court, without
undertaking a detailed examination of the principles involved in the interpretation of the War-
saw Convention, noted:
To determine the meaning of [the] term accident in Article 17, we must consider the
French legal meaning. . . because the Warsaw Convention was drafted in French by
continental jurists. . . [and] because it is our responsibility to give the specific words
of a treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting
parties.
105 S. Ct. at 1343.
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